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The full or partial acquisition of land remains a predominant focus of terres-
trial conservation strategies. Non-governmental organizations play an impor-
tant role in habitat protection, yet few studies investigate their contribution to
conservation investment. Here we examine temporal trends in the size of land
transactions made by the world’s largest land trust, The Nature Conservancy
(TNC). We consider three dimensions of deal size (area, upfront cost, and rel-
ative cost per hectare) for two commonly used conservation approaches (fee
simple acquisitions and conservation easements). Mean area of protected land
parcels has been robust to the growing subdivision of properties for sale. Vari-
ation in the area and cost of transactions ranged between six and eight orders
of magnitude, and increased through time as TNC undertook occasional large
deals once established. Conservation planning approaches need to better ac-
count for the variation in deal sizes, and how this may change in response to
dynamic budgets and priorities.
Introduction
Land acquisition is the cornerstone of terrestrial con-
servation strategies aimed at slowing persistent rates of
habitat destruction and associated losses of biodiversity
(Wilcove & Chen 1998; Ferraro & Kiss 2002). Current
public sector investment falls substantially short of the
expenditure required to protect habitats (Lerner et al.
2007) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
an important role to play in helping to address this deficit
in investment (Albers & Ando 2003; Merenlender et al.
2004). However, habitat protection comes at a price and
the conservation community is under increasing pressure
to allocate limited financial resources effectively (James
et al. 1999; Murdoch et al. 2007). Despite this, informa-
tion regarding the strategic choices made by NGOs re-
mains limited (but see Halpern et al. 2006; Lerner et al.
2007; Fishburn et al. 2009a, b).
In this article, we examine 50 years of land transac-
tions made by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) across the
United States. TNC is the largest environmentally ori-
ented NGO in the United States, holding 20% of the over-
all sector’s assets and managing 11% of total revenue
(Straughan & Pollak 2008). Over the five decades TNC
has been in operation, the organization has maintained
a consistent conservation mission and homogeneous fi-
nancial records of all land transactions; the temporal
and spatial extent of the resulting data set is, therefore,
unsurpassed.
We assess how the size of conservation investments
has changed through time, focusing on three measures of
deal size (area, upfront acquisition cost, and acquisition
cost per hectare). Understanding the size of land trans-
actions in terms of area remains one of the most fun-
damental questions in conservation planning. Since the
late 1970s, when the “single large or several small” re-
serve selection debate came to the fore (Diamond 1975;
Simberloff & Abele 1982), there has been much discus-
sion regarding the optimal size of land parcels to be pro-
tected to maximize species richness (e.g., Pyke 1983)
while sustaining minimum viable population sizes (e.g.,
Soule´ 1987; Caughley 1994). More recently, research
into maximizing the effectiveness of conservation efforts
has focused on where protected areas should be located
(Margules & Pressey 2000). Critically, the outcomes of
such optimal reserve-site selection studies depend on the
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size of individual land parcels available for protection
(Pressey et al. 1999; Warman et al. 2004). Since 1950,
the size of rural land parcels in U.S. land markets has
reduced due to the ongoing subdivision of properties
for sale (Brown et al. 2004). Unless TNC has taken in-
vestment decisions that prioritized properties in a way
that counteract this trend, the mean area of individual
land transactions would be expected to have decreased
through time.
In relation to the financial dimensions of deal size,
there is a growing recognition that efficiency gains can be
exploited by integrating spatially explicit land cost infor-
mation into conservation planning (e.g., Ando et al. 1998;
Naidoo et al. 2006). A change in the cost per hectare of
properties protected by TNC through time could signal
a move toward more strategic priority setting (Margules
& Pressey 2000). The overall cost of land transactions
is also important, especially when considering dynamic
budget allocation decisions (Costello & Polasky 2004;
Meir et al. 2004; Strange et al. 2006), as future options will
become constrained if an organization commits to large
individual deals.
We compare all three elements of deal size for two dis-
tinct approaches to land conservation: fee simple acquisi-
tions and conservation easements. With fee simple acqui-
sition, an organization takes ownership of a land parcel,
whereas an easement is a voluntary agreement between
a private landowner and an organization to restrict spe-
cific management rights on a parcel of land that are in-
compatible with conservation objectives (e.g., the right
to clear-cut timber) (Merenlender et al. 2004; see Parker
2004 and Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008 for discussion
on the comparative advantages of the two approaches).
An improved understanding of the nature of proper-
ties available for protection via these two conservation
approaches, and quantification of the relative costs in-
volved, will help inform debates regarding what balance
of investments is desirable in different socioeconomic and
ecological contexts (Pence et al. 2003; Parker 2004; Mur-
doch et al. 2007; Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008; Nelson
et al. 2008). Conservation planning strategies that incor-
porate such real-world information on opportunities and
constraints are more likely to result in successful imple-
mentation (Knight et al. 2008).
Methods
Data collation
The TNC land transaction database comprised all deals
made in the 48 contiguous states of the United States be-
tween 1954 and 2004. A “deal” was defined as the total
area and cost invested in all subdivided land transactions
of the same name, occurring within the same state and
finalized within 1 month of each other. Only the upfront
cost of acquisition was recorded within the database and
thus the subsequent management costs for land parcels
were not considered. In addition, inadequate spatial ref-
erences for land parcels prevented us from identifying
where transactions had been made to buffer previously
protected sites. Nonetheless, this does not systematically
bias our analyses as we are examining temporal, not spa-
tial, patterns of investment. It should be noted, however,
that the data set only represents the opportunities to pro-
tect land that were taken by TNC; we do not know what
land parcels were considered by the organization but not
acquired.
Six conservation investment data sets were con-
structed: the area (Hectares), cost (Dollars) and relative
cost (Dollars per Hectare) of each deal were extracted from
the database for both fee simple acquisitions and con-
servation easements. Deals relating to water rights (and
therefore with an area of 0 ha) were excluded from the
two area data sets, full donations were removed from the
cost data sets, and both water rights and full donations
were omitted from the relative cost data sets.
All financial data were standardized to 2004 to cor-
rect for inflation through time. Commonly, this would be
achieved using price indices, such as the consumer price
index (CPI). The CPI measures inflation based on the
purchasing power of households by studying variation in
the cost of a representative “basket” of consumer goods
and services between time periods. Here we use the same
principle to examine variability in the purchasing power
of TNC, standardizing our financial data according to the
more indicative change in price per hectare of farm real
estate. This benchmark is more appropriate for our anal-
yses and ensures that any changes detected in the cost
of investments made by TNC occur over and above base-
line trends in land price inflation. Historical land values
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA NASS) at
the state-level, thereby allowing us to account more ac-
curately for spatial variation in land markets across the
United States at the same scale over which TNC operates
(most land transactions are overseen by state chapters).
All data sets were log-transformed to meet assumptions
of normality. This also guarantees that any increase in the
variation in deal size is not simply a product of a multi-
plicative error structure.
Statistical inference
For each of the land conservation tools, associations be-
tween the three different measures of deal size (Hectares,
Dollars, and Dollars per Hectare) were assessed using Spear-
man’s rank correlation. Mann-Whitney U tests were used
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Figure 1 The size of individual deals, plotted on a logarithmic scale, through time for: (A) fee simple acquisitions and (B) conservation easements,
measured by (i) area, (ii) cost, and (iii) relative cost per hectare.
to compare median deal sizes for fee simple acquisitions
and conservation easements.
In all six investment data sets, the characteristic
fan-shaped plot of individual deal sizes against year
(Figure 1) indicated heteroscedasticity, which prevented
us relying on simple linear regression to detect trends in
the central tendency of deal size through time. Year-on-
year changes in the annual variance for deal size were
therefore examined using piecewise regression. For each
data set, alternative two- and three-segment models were
compared using information-theoretic methods. As sam-
ple sizes were less than 50, second-order Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AICc) values were used to control for the
number of parameters and assess model parsimony. In all
cases, a two-segment piecewise model was the most par-
simonious descriptor of the relationship between annual
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Figure 2 Cumulative patterns of deal size through time for: (A) fee simple acquisitions and (B) conservation easements, measured by (i) area and (ii) cost.
variance in deal size and time. Mann-Whitney U tests
were used to confirm that the annual variances before
the break point were smaller than those after. Finally,
we examined trends in the central tendency of individual
deal sizes using linear regression through the two time
segments. Bias-corrected accelerated (BCa) 95% confi-
dence intervals for the regression line slopes were boot-
strapped based on 10,000 resampling events. All analyses
were carried out in R (version 2.8.1, R Development Core
Team 2008).
Results
Between 1954 and 2004, TNC made over 10,000 fee
simple acquisitions, protecting in excess of 2.3 million
hectares at an upfront cost of more than US$5.3 billion
(Figure 2). In comparison, from 1961 and the introduc-
tion of conservation easements, TNC secured approxi-
mately 1,600 easement deals with a value of US$1 billion
and coverage of 1.3 million hectares. The annual budget
and total land area protected each year, for both fee sim-
ple acquisitions and conservation easements, has grown
through time.
The area and cost of land transactions were correlated
for both fee simple acquisitions and conservation ease-
ments (Figure S1), but leave much of the variation in
the data unexplained (Table 1). Associations among other
variables (e.g., hectares and relative cost per hectare),
while present, are no stronger than would be expected
given how the variables relate to one another.
The median cost per hectare for fee simple acquisitions
was greater than that for easements by a factor of 1.2
(Figure 3; z = −4.26, P < 0.001). However, land parcels
Table 1 Correlation between different measures of deal size for fee
simple acquisitions (n = 7,115) and conservation easements (n = 733)
rs P
Fee Hectares vs. dollars 0.71 <0.001
Hectares vs. dollars per hectare −0.49 0.496a
Dollars vs. dollars per hectare 0.19 0.499a
Easements Hectares vs. dollars 0.53 <0.001
Hectares vs. dollars per hectare −0.59 0.492a
Dollars vs. dollars per hectare 0.29 0.502a
a Bootstrapped P values (based on 10,000 resampling events) are given
for the correlations of hectares and dollars with dollars per hectare, due
to the x and y values not being independent (Brett 2004).
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Figure 3 Comparison ofmedian deal size for fee simple acquisitions (gray
bars) and conservation easements (hatched bars), measured by (A) area,
(B) cost, and (C) relative cost per hectare. Bars represent the interquartile
range.
protected using easements were, on average, three-fold
larger than those conserved by fee simple acquisition
(z = −19.55, P < 0.001) and, when the two results
are combined, the overall cost of an individual easement
transaction was more than twice as large as that for a fee
simple deal (z = −11.25, P < 0.001).
Over the 50-year study period, individual deal sizes
exhibited considerable variation (Figures 1 and 3). The
size of fee simple acquisitions differed by between six
orders of magnitude for Hectares (range: 0.02–40,000)
and eight orders for Dollars (range: 0.73–87 million).
Dollars per Hectare (range: 0.22–5.5 million) varied by
seven orders of magnitude. Similarly, the deal sizes for
all three of the easement data sets differed by seven or-
ders of magnitude (Hectares, range: 0.03–300,000; Dollars,
range: 1.35–55 million; Dollars per Hectare, range: 0.08–
1.8 million).
The break points generated by the two-segment piece-
wise models of annual variance of deal size through
time were consistent for all three measures of investment
for both fee simple acquisitions (range: 1967–1969) and
easements (range: 1980–1986). Furthermore, for each
data set, the annual variances for deal size were lower be-
fore the break point compared to those after (Figure 4),
providing evidence that a time signal was indeed appar-
ent. However, year-on-year changes in annual variance
were harder to detect (Figure 4). A linear relationship
of annual variance in deal size increasing over time was
only evident for Dollars per Hectare for fee simple acquisi-
tions in the segment prior to the break point (ß = 0.17
[SE = 0.04]; F = 15.34; P = 0.001; R2 = 0.53), and for
easements Hectares, both before (ß = 0.49 [SE = 0.09];
F = 19.36; P = 0.002; R2 = 0.67) and after the break
point (ß = 0.10; F = 12.81; P = 0.002; R2 = 0.33).
When patterns in mean deal size through time were
examined within segments, the size of individual deals in-
creased for all of the fee simple acquisition data sets prior
to each respective break point, as did Hectares for ease-
ments (Table 2). Correspondingly, the area protected in
individual transactions also increased through time after
the break point for both land conservation approaches.
However, the models accounted for only between 0.4%
and 24% of the variation in the data set segments, and
the rate of increase in deal size was small in relation to
the noise within the data sets.
Inspection of the Hectares and Dollars annual upper
quartiles for fee simple transactions indicates that the in-
creasing variability in deal size is a result of TNC investing
in a growing number of relatively large land transactions
(Figure S2). Nevertheless, the occurrence of these partic-
ularly large investments is not a standard practice and,
consequently, does not drive sizeable increases in central
tendency through time.
Discussion
Many theoretical studies have investigated how to op-
timize resource allocation for habitat conservation (see
Margules & Pressey 2000; Naidoo et al. 2006 for exam-
ples), yet few studies have explored empirical patterns
of investment made by conservation agencies or NGOs
(but see Halpern et al. 2006; Lerner et al. 2007; Fish-
burn et al. 2009a, b). In this paper, we continue to bridge
this knowledge gap between theoretical conservation
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Figure 4 Annual variance for deal size through time for: (A) fee simple
acquisitions and (B) conservation easements, measured by (i) area, (ii)
cost, and (iii) relative cost per hectare. Solid lines indicate the break point
generated by unconstrained two-segment piecewise regression models;
dotted lines represent segment linear relationships; P values are given
for Mann-Whitney U tests comparingmedian annual variances in deal size
before and after the break point.
biology and on-the-ground practice by examining tem-
poral trends in the size of land transactions made by the
largest conservation NGO.
When deal sizes were compared between the different
land conservation approaches, individual easements were
three times larger in area and cost twice as much as fee
simple acquisitions. However, fee simple deals were more
expensive on a cost-per-hectare basis than easements.
For both approaches, the area and cost of individual deals
were correlated, but were not reliable surrogates for one
another as much of the variability in the relationship was
left unexplained.
Since 1954, the average area of TNC’s fee simple acqui-
sitions has risen, although the growth rate slowed after
1968. A similar pattern was observed for the size of ease-
ments, with a reduction in the rate of increase from 1980.
This slight increase in the average area of deals through
time has occurred despite a decrease in the size of rural
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Table 2 Linear regression models for each data set before and after the break point determined by two-segment piecewise regression
Break point Pre/post Bootstrapped 95%
year break segment ß (SE) R2 F P confidence intervals
Fee hectares 1968 Pre 0.030 0.016 6.283 0.013 0.005–0.055
(0.012)
Post 0.006 0.004 37.416 <0.001 0.005–0.009
(0.001)
Fee dollars 1967 Pre 0.043 0.032 5.210 0.024 0.008–0.085
(0.019)
Post 0.002 0.000 3.376 0.066 −0.001–0.004
(0.001)
Fee dollars per hectare 1969 Pre 0.035 0.021 5.411 0.021 0.008–0.065
(0.015)
Post −0.001 0.000 2.418 0.120 −0.003–0.037
(0.001)
Easement hectares 1980 Pre 0.176 0.244 20.639 <0.001 0.102–0.273
(0.039)
Post 0.028 0.03 47.467 <0.001 0.020–0.037
(0.004)
Easement dollars 1986 Pre −0.036 0.007 0.090 0.769 −0.239–0.210
(0.119)
Post 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.952 −0.015–0.016
(0.008)
Easement dollars per hectare 1986 Pre 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.950 −0.180–0.220
(0.098)
Post 0.007 0.001 0.771 0.380 −0.024–0.011
(0.008)
land parcels available in U.S. land markets (Brown et al.
2004). Dissecting this divergence in more detail would re-
quire additional data on deals considered by TNC but not
transacted.
The most striking discovery is the considerable vari-
ability in deal size across the 50-year period, ranging be-
tween six and eight orders of magnitude for both fee
simple acquisitions and conservation easements. For ex-
ample, variation in the cost per hectare of land protec-
tion is much greater than suggested in previous studies.
Past estimates of per unit area costs have been derived
from either local averages (e.g., the mean value of agri-
cultural land within a U.S. county; Polasky et al. 2001)
or observable land characteristics (e.g., soil productivity,
elevation; Naidoo & Adamowicz 2006). The first of these
methods cannot account for the fact that biodiversity de-
pends on specific, not average, parcels of land. The second
approach does not allow for the idiosyncratic nature of
individual deals in land markets, where prices may reflect
the opportunities, personal circumstances, and unobserv-
able values of the vendor and buyer (Knight & Cowl-
ing 2007). Although some remote methods of estimating
costs have generated reliable proxies for land values (e.g.,
Naidoo & Adamowicz 2006 achieved R2 = 0.89 for actual
versus modeled property prices across a 2,920 km2 study
area in Paraguay), others have been less successful (e.g.,
Jack et al. 2009 had an explanatory power of R2 = 0.08 for
estimates of short-term rental agreement costs in two In-
donesian villages). Overall, such estimates have predicted
the variation in the cost per hectare of conservation land
transactions to be between two to four orders of magni-
tude (Ando et al. 1998; Naidoo et al. 2006), yet our find-
ings demonstrate that the actual extent of the variation is
much greater at seven orders of magnitude. Importantly,
this means that the efficiency savings made possible by
accounting for costs in conservation planning are likely
to have been substantially underestimated.
TNC has become more willing to undertake occasional,
particularly large land transactions as the organization
has grown and realized that large landscapes are neces-
sary for conserving many species and ecosystems. Inter-
estingly, however, there has not been a systematic shift
away from undertaking small deals as well, raising ques-
tions about whether it is efficient for one organization to
fill both niches in the conservation market place. In ad-
dition, the ability of conservation organizations to under-
take large investments once established is an important
consideration for dynamic conservation planning studies
(e.g., Costello & Polasky 2004; Meir et al. 2004; Murdoch
et al. 2007).
Conservation practitioners and planners need to be
cautious about how large protected areas will impact the
Conservation Letters 3 (2010) 29–37 Copyright and Photocopying: c©2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 35
Temporal patterns of conservation investment Z.G. Davies et al.
surrounding landscape (Armsworth et al. 2006). “Leak-
age” can occur when conservation purchases push up
surrounding land prices which, in turn, can potentially
undermine conservation efforts by displacing develop-
ment toward important habitats that remain unprotected
(Armsworth et al. 2006; McDonald et al. 2007). To date,
some have argued that the impact of such land mar-
ket feedbacks are likely to be negligible due to the rel-
atively small areas of land parcels protected by conserva-
tion organizations and agencies (Ando et al. 1998; Polasky
2006). However, we have shown that at least some con-
servation deals can be substantial in size.
TNC’s willingness to undertake large land transactions
has increased as the organization itself has grown. To de-
termine whether growing rather than fixed annual bud-
gets are the norm for conservation NGOs or something
particular to TNC, we examined changes in expenditure
between 2004 and 2007 of a randomly selected sample of
100 NGOs active in the biodiversity conservation sector
and registered for tax purposes within the United States,
using data collated from annual tax returns (available
from www.guidestar.org and based on IRS 990 forms).
The NGOs examined during this time frame had a posi-
tive growth rate (Wilcoxon signed rank test: V = 3455;
P < 0.001) with an average increase of US$80,600 over
the 3-year period after controlling for inflation. Similarly,
there is evidence that expenditure is related to the num-
ber of years a NGO has been established (Figure S3).
These results should be interpreted as preliminary, be-
cause we have not controlled for bias due to survivorship
effects (Sutton 1997), but may reflect the ongoing ex-
pansion of the environmental nonprofit sector, which is
growing faster than other nonprofit sectors and the econ-
omy at large (Harrison & Laincz 2008; Straughan & Pollak
2008).
Here we have illustrated that conservation practice is
more influenced by internal (e.g., annual budgets) and
external (e.g., size of available land parcels) constraints
than is currently assumed by existing reserve-site selec-
tion tools. By incorporating such information into con-
servation planning approaches, they will become more
indicative of how the business of conservation actu-
ally operates, better reflecting the trade-offs practitioners
make between meeting conservation objectives, the rela-
tive level of protection afforded to a land parcel and the
cost of protection.
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